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STATE TAXATION AND THE SUPREME COURT:
TOWARD A MORE UNIFIED APPROACH TO
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION?
, Walter Hellerstein*t

The Supreme Court's decisions delineating the constitutional
limitations on state tax power have often defied rational analysis.
The Court read the commerce clause1 as forbidding a state tax on
the privilege of doing interstate business 2 but not on the privilege
of doing interstate business in corporate form. 3 It construed the
import-export clause4 as prohibiting a state tax on bales of imported
hemp awaiting use in manufacturing5 but not on piles of imported
ore and plywood awaiting such use. 6 It interpreted the supremacy
clause7 as barring a state tax upon the sale of goods to one government contractor8 but not to another0 because the second was not
deemed to be a purchasing agent for the federal government, even
though in both instances the federal government bore the economic
burden of the tax and ultimately took title to the goods. Indeed,
the Court itself came to recognize that consistency was not the hallmark of its pronouncements in this field, 10 that form occasionally prevailed over substance, 11 and that "[t]o attempt to harmonize all that
has been said in the past would neither clarify what has gone before
nor guide the future." 12
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. A.B. 1967, Harvard
University; J.D. 1970, The University of Chicago.-Ed.
t The author would like to thank Walter J. Blum, Gerhard Casper, and Phil C.
Neal for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
3. See Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975). See generally
W. Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court,
1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. REV. 149,
176-88 (1976).
4. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2; see note 20 infra.
5. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945).
6. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959). See generally W. Hellerstein, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages: Enhanced State Power To Tax
Imports, 1916 SUP. CT. REV. 99.
7. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
8. See Kem-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
9. See Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
10. See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
458 (1959); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954).
11. See Kem-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 122-23 (1954).
12. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249,252 (1946).
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In light of the difficulties in generalizing about the Court's precedents regarding particular constitutional limitations on state tax
power, generalizations embracing decisions directed to several separate limitations are especially suspect since they aggravate the danger
of oversimplifying problems that have been resolved for years on the
basis of razor-thin factual distinctions and ephemeral doctrinal
nuances. 13 Nevertheless, with due regard for the hazards of speculation in this area, there are grounds for suggesting that the Court
is moving toward a more systematic approach to interpretation of
those constitutional inhibitions on state taxation that, broadly speaking, bear on the allocation of powers between state and national
governments in our federal system. 14 The evidence for this hypothesis-several recent decisions handed down by the Court over a relatively brief period-is admittedly fragmentary, but it is sufficient to
warrant a preliminary inquiry and some tentative conclusions.
The first section of this Article examines three recent cases, each
addressed to a different constitutional limitation on the scope of state
tax power, that may be read as signifying a new approach: Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 15 which concerned the import-export clause;16
United States v. r;ounty of Fresno,1 7 which concerned the supremacy
clause; and Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 18 which concerned
the commerce clause. Section II considers the implications of these
decisions and explores -the possibility that they share an underlying
doctrinal unity.
I.
A.

THE COURT'S DECISIONS

Michelin Tire Cor,p. v. Wages19

In Michelin, the Supreme Court abandoned a century of precedent in holding that the import-export clause does not bar a state
from imposing a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on im13. See W. Hellerstein, Some Reflections on the State Taxation of a Nonresident's
Personal Income, 12 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1309-10 & nn.1-10 (1974); W. Hellerstein, supra note 6; W. Hellerstein, supra note 3. The Court has explicitly warned
against the dangers of overgeneralizing in this manner. See, e.g., Richfield Oil Corp.
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 75-76 (1946).
14. Other restraints on the states' power of taxation-those arising out of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment and the privileges and immunities clause of article IV-constitute limitations that relate primarily
to concerns other than the allocation of authority between state and federal governments.
15. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
16. See note 20 infra.
17. 97 s. Ct. 699 (1977).
18. 97 s. Ct. 1076 (1977).
19. The following discussion draws freely from my article, supra note 6.
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ported goods. In so holding, the Court returned to the original purposes of the clause and revised the analytical framework for determining when a state tax is a forbidden "impost" or "duty" on
imports. 20
Michelin Tire Corporation, an importer and wholesale distributor
in the United States of automobile and truck tires manufactured in
France and Canada, brought suit in a Georgia state court to contest
the constitutionality of ad valorem property taxes levied upon
Michelin's inventory of imported tires stored in a warehouse pending
distribution. 21 Michelin argued that the tires were immune from
property taxes under the import-export clause.
The Georgia courts, following settled principles of adjudication
under the import-export clause, analyzed the validity of the tax by
addressing the question whether the tires had retained their status
as imports when the tax was assessed. The trial court determined
that the tires had retained such status 22 on the basis of its reading
of the classic formulation from Brown v. Ma.ryland: 28
It is sufficient for the present to say, generally, that when the
importer has so acted upon the thing imported that it has become
incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country,
it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character, as an import, and
has become subject to the taxing power of the State; but while
remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the
original form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it
20. The complete text of the clause reads:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by
any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul
of the Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
21. Michelin also imported automobile and truck tire tubes. The taxation of
these items was at issue in the state courts but not in the Supreme Court. That
issue will not be considered here, but it is discussed in W. Hellerstein, supra note
6, at 101-06.
All real and personal property in Georgia, unless specifically exempted, is subject
to taxation. GA. CODE ANN. § 92-101 (1974). The county is authori:zed to levy
taxes for current expenses, accumulated debts, and other county purposes. GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 92-3702, -3706, -3707, -3713, -3715, -3717, -3718 (1974). The order assessing the county tax for the year must state the percentage levied for each specific
purpose, and the assessment also applies to property taxed by the state. GA. CODE
ANN. § 92-3801 (1974). The county tax authority is obligated to have a statement
prepared of the amount of tax required for county purposes each year. GA. CODE
ANN. § 92-3709 (1974). All tangible property is assessed at 40% of the fair market
value. GA. CODE ANN. § 92-5703 (1974). The tax rate is the aggregate of all
lawful levies. STATE TAX GUIDE (CCH) 1[ 20-354 (1977).
22. Petition for Certiorari at A-4, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276
(1976).
23. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
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is too plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the
constitution.24
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed. 25 After a lengthy
exegesis on the "original package" doctrine, the court concluded that
the tires, which had been sorted by size and style and commingled
with other shipments, had lost their status as imports and, thus, were
subject to taxation.
Michelin petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari,
and the Court granted the petition. 26 The only question presented
by the parties was the constitutionality under the import-export
clause of the assessment of the state property tax upon Michelin's
tires, a question both parties framed in terms of the physical packaging, form, and arrangement of the tires. 27
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Georgia
Supreme Court, but on a different ground. It ignored the question
whether the state court had accurately drawn the line between taximmune imports and goods that had become "-incorporated and
mixed up with the mass of property in the country." 2 ~ Instead it
ruled that "Georgia's assessment of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem
property tax against the imported tires is not within the constitutional
prohibition against 'laying any Imposts or Duties on Imports . . .'
and that insofar as Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. 29 (1872) is to the contrary, that decision is overruled.''29 What induced the Supreme
Court to reconsider Low is a matter for speculation,30 but its opinion
in Michelin marks a fundamental reexamination of the purpose and
scope of the import-export clause's prohibition against state taxation
of imports. In contrast to its past opinions in this area, which were
often characterized by a mechanistic application of Marshall's "original package" language in Brown v. Maryland to determine whether
the goods under consideration had ceased to be "imports,"31 the
Court's opinion explicitly refrained from addressing the question
24. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 441-42.
25. Wages v. Michelin Tire Corp., 233 Ga. 712, 214 S.E.2d 349 (1975).
26. 422 U.S. 1040 (1975).

27. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2; Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2. See 423 U.S. at 302 (White, J., concurring).
28. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 441.
29. 423 U.S. at 279.

30. Conceivably, the Court was persuaded by the arguments of the California
and Texas amici curiae brief on this issue. The importance of the question to states
and localities may have been indicated by the submission of amicus curiae briefs
by Kansas, Ohio, and Georgia, although these states did not argue that Low had
been wrongly decided.
31. See, e.g., Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 664-65 (1945); text
at notes 4-6 supra.
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whether Michelin's tires had lost their status as "imports."32 Rather
the Court focused upon the nature of the exaction at issue to ascertain whether it constituted a forbidden "impost" or "duty."
In exploring this question, the Court examined anew first the
purpose and then the text of the import-export clause. The Court
identified three principal concerns of the framers underlying the
adoption of the constitutional prohibition against state taxation of imports. First, "the Federal Government must speak with one voice
when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments, and
tariffs, which might affect foreign relations, could not be implemented by the States consistently with that exclusive power." 33
Second, "import revenues were to be the major source of revenue
of the Federal Government and should not be diverted to the
States."34 Third, "harmony among the States might be disturbed unless seaboard States, with their crucial ports of entry, were prohibited
from levying taxes on citizens of other States by taxing goods merely
flowing through their ports to the inland States not situated as favorably geographically."35
Viewing the tax in the light of these concerns, the Court could
perceive nothing objectionable in a nondiscriminatory ad valorem
property tax imposed on imports no longer in transit. It was "obvious" to the Court that such a tax could have "no impact whatsoever
on the Federal Government's exclusive regulation of foreign commerce," because such a tax did not fall on imports "as such," and,
therefore, could not be used "to create special protective tariffs or
particular preferences for certain domestic goods," and could not be
"applied selectively to encourage or discourage any importation in
a manner inconsistent with federal regulation." 36
The Court likewise found that imposition of a nondiscriminatory
ad valorem property tax would not imperil the federal government's
reliance upon imposts and duties as a major source of anticipated
revenue. The Court's reasoning was in part definitional: because
"nondiscriminatory ad valorem taxation is not in that category [of
imposts and duties on imports], it deprives the Federal Government
of nothing to which it is entitled."37 In supporting its position that
such taxes do not fall within the defined category, the Court again
returned to the point that it regarded as most critical-the nondis32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

423
423
423
423
423
423

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at
at
at
at
at
at

279.
285.
285.
285-86.
286.
286-87.
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criminatory character of the levies. Since a nondiscriminatory tax
"cannot be selectively imposed and increased so as substantially to
impair or prohibit importation," 38 such a tax has at most an "incidental effect" on federal import revenues "to the extent its economic
burden may discourage purchase or importation of foreign goods. " 39
According to the Court, prevention of this minor diminution of federal revenues was not "even remotely an objective of the Framers."40
Nor, in the Court's view, would the imposition of nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxes frustrate the third objective underlying the import-export clause: preserving harmony and maintaining
the free flow of imported goods among the states by preventing some
states from exploiting their favorable geographic location by taxing
goods destined for other states. Here the Court was a bit more
tentative. It acknowledged that "allowance of nondiscriminatory ad
valorem property taxation may increase the cost of goods purchased
by 'inland' consumers."41 Furthermore, it may well have sensed,
though it was not willing to say so explicitly, that nondiscriminatory
property taxes imposed on goods stored by an importer-wholesaler
like Michelin for distribution throughout the United States might in
fact interfere with the free flow of imports among the states "by
virtue of the cumulative impact of such taxes on the price of goods
on their way to become part of a stock of goods for resale locally." 42
But, the Court reiterated, the tax "is the quid pro quo for benefits actually conferred by the taxing state," 43 so to deny the state
the power to tax the property would compel it to provide either a
subsidy to ultimate consumers or a competitive advantage to distributors and manufacturers dealing with imported goods. Moreover, the Court declared that the purposes of the import-export
clause would be fully secured "merely by prohibiting the assessment
of even nondiscriminatory property taxes on goods which are merely
in transit through the State when the tax is assessed." 44 The clause
38. 423 U.S. at 287-88.
39. 423 U.S. at 287.
40. 423 U.S. at 287.
41. 423 U.S. at 288.
42. Dakin, The Protective Cloak of the Export-Import Clause: Immunity for
the Goods or Immunity for the Process?, 19 LA. L. REV. 747, 766 (1959).
43. 423 U.S. at 289.
44. 423 U.S. at 290. The Court also noted that traditional commerce clause
doctrine would likewise afford protection to the free flow of goods. 423 U.S. at
290 n.11. Indeed, the Court's gingerly treatment of this issue may have stemmed
from its experience under the commerce clause. The Court had developed a doctrinal limitation on the constitutionality of nondiscriminatory state taxes ii:i adopting
the "multiple burdens" theory, see, e.g., Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,
303 U.S. 250, 258-60 (1938), which was most succinctly expressed in Justice Rut-
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would thus forbid a tax that threatened to impose a special burden
upon imports, even though the levy did not explicitly discriminate
against them.
Having demonstrated that the levy of a nondiscriminatory ad
valorem property tax on imports would not, except to the limited extent noted, contravene the objectives of the import-export clause, the
Court turned to the text of the clause itself. Conceding that the
clause did not by its terms exclude nondiscriminatory taxes from its
prohibition, the Court pointed out that it was equally clear that not
every tax-but only "imposts or duties"-lay within its scope. As the
Court noted, the constitutional grant of power to Congress "to lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises"45 supports a reading
of the import-export clause as not forbidding every tax that falls in
some measure on imports-a conclusion bolstered by Professor
Crosskey's "persuasive demonstration" 46 that the words "imposts"
and "duties" were understood in 1787 to be exactions upon imports
or importation as such. 47 Although these considerations might have
supported a definitive interpretation of the clause on the basis of its
text, the Court was content to conclude that the language of the
clause is sufficiently ambiguous to permit it to reject a construction
that would not further the clause's objectives. 48 Since these objectives were undisturbed by nondiscriminatory ad valorem property
taxation, the text of the clause would not be construed as forbidding
it.
It remained only for the Court to e~plain the error of its previous
ways, to wit, Low v. Austin's49 misreading of Brown v. Maryland.
Brown was precisely the type of case to which the import-export
ledge's concurring opinion in International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury,
322 U.S. 340,358 (1944):
[T]he state may not impose certain taxes on interstate commerce, its incidents
or instrumentalities, which are no more in amount or burden than it places on
its local business, not because this of itself is discriminatory, cumulative or
special or would violate due process, but because other states also may have
the right constitutionally, apart from the commerce clause, to tax the same
thing and either the actuality or the risk of their doing so makes the total burden
cumulative, discriminatory or special.
See W. Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 150-51 & n.6.
45. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
46. 423 U.S. at 290-91.
41. See 1 w. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CON5l'ITUTION IN THE HlsroRY OF
THE UNITED STATES 296 (1953).
48. Chief Justice Marshall expressed similar views regarding the appropriate approach to interpreting the import-export clause: "When we are inquiring, whether
a particular act is within this prohibition, the question is not, whether the State
may so legislate as to so hurt itself, but whether the act is within the words and
mischief of the prohibitory clause." Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419,
440 (1827).
49. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1872).
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clause was directed. It involved a fee levied by a coastal state on
importers for a license they were required to obtain before selling
within the state. Since the fee was equivalent to a discriminatory
tax on the goods themselves, which fell squarely within the clause's
prohibition, it could not stand. Although the Court in Brown devised the celebrated "original package" test as an evidentiary tool
for determining when imported goods had lost their status as imports
and thus the protection of the clause, it had indicated that the status
of the goods was only one of the determinants of the validity of the
tax. The other was the character of the tax: the clause prohibits
only imposts and duties, not all exactions regardless of their nature. 50
The Michelin Court had taken some pains to make this point, which
it was now prepared to find "clearly implied" in Brown. 51
In Low v. Austin, 52 however, the Court had held, with "no
50. See 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 437.
51. 423 U.S. at 298. It is not so clear that the Court in Brown regarded nondiscriminatory taxes as falling outside the proscription of the import-export clause.
The Michelin Court found support for such a view in Chief Justice Marshall's comment that the exception in the import-export clause for imposts and duties "for the
support of inspection laws, goes far in proving that the framers of the constitution
classed taxes of a similar character with those "imposed for the PUrPOses of inspection,
with duties on imports and exports, and supposed them to be prohibited." 423 U.S.
at 297 (emphasis original) (quoting Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at
438). Reference to the entire passage from which the excerPt was quoted suggests
that Marshall was simply making the point that a commodity does not lose its status
as an import upon landing because inspection duties are generally levied after the
goods are landed. See 423 U.S. at 276. Indeed, the application of the inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius principle to Marshall's observation that an inspection tax
is a tax paid for services performed on land would suggest that other taxes imposed
on imports to recover expenses incurred by the state-such as a property tax-are
proscribed. See W. Hellerstein, supra note 6, at 108 n.51.
Chief Justice Marshall also stated that the critical feature of the Maryland tax
was that it "intercept[ed] the import, as an import." 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 443.
The Michelin Court cited this as being indicative of the Brown Court's position that
only those taxes levied exclusively on imports fall within the ban of the importexport clause. See 423 U.S. at 298. However, Chief Justice Marshall at this point
was distinguishing between a tax on imports assessed before and one assessed after
the imports are incorPorated into the stream of commerce. He was not distinguishing between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory taxes. The other taxes Chief Justice Marshall mentioned, such as a tax for the use of a public auctioneer, can be
viewed as levies not on imports or on the right to import but on activities collateral
to the act of importing.
This is not to say that the Court's analysis of the policies underlying the importexport clause failed to justify its conclusion. The point is merely that the Court in
Michelin may have overstated the support Brown offers for the appropriate result.
Indeed, if the Court had been less anxious to find support in Brown, it might have
acknowledged that its decision virtually displaced the "original package" concept altogether. See W. Hellerstein, supra note 6, at 116-17. One could argue that a discriminatory state tax on, for example, the retail sale of foreign-made televisions
would, under the fundamental rationale of Michelin, violate the import-export clause
though the goods previously were removed from their original packages. In any
event, it would clearly violate the commerce clause. See id. at 117.
52. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1872).
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analysis,"53 that the state cannot levy a nondiscriminatory property tax
on imported goods so long as they remain "imports." 54 According
to Michelin, Low ignored "the language and objectives of the ImportExport Clause, and . . . the limited nature of the holding in
Brown," 55 and misperceived the scope of the "original package" doctrine. 56 Low, it followed, had been incorrectly decided and was
therefore overruled. 57
Once the Court had formulated the governing doctrine, it had
little difficulty upholding the levy at issue since Michelin did not contend that the tax was discriminatory on its face or as applied, and
the Court summarily determined that the tires were not in transit. Gs
In short, the Court in Michelin transfigured import-export clause
analysis. By reexamining the underlying policies of the clause and
the seminal decision construing it, the Court shifted the focus of the
analysis away from the intricacies of the "original package" test to
the more tractable question of the character of the tax. Go And in
so doing, the Court made it clear that the crux of the constitutional
inquiry was whether the exaction at issue discriminated against or
imposed a special burden upon imported goods.
B.

United States v. County of Fresno 00

In County of Fresno, as in Michelin, the Supreme Court rediscovered the "original intent" 61 of the seminal case construing a constitutional provision limiting state taxation and concluded that the
nondiscriminatory levy in question lay outside the provision's scope.
The supremacy clause, like the import-export clause, forbids state
taxes directed specifically against the protected interest-the federal government ,in the one case, imports in the other. But, the Court
now emphasizes, M'Culloch v. Maryland62 cannot be read as cutting a
broad swath of tax immunity for federal instrumentalities any more
than Brown v. Maryland can be read as creating such an immunity
for imports.
In County of Fresno, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a local tax on possessory interests in publicly owned, tax53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

423 U.S. at 294.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 34.
423 U.S. at 298.
423 U.S. at 282.
423 U.S. at 301.
423 U.S. at 302.
See text at notes 32-44 supra.
97 S. Ct. 699 (1977).
97 S. Ct. at 705.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See text at notes 78-80 infra.
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exempt realty as applied to federal employees living in federally
owned houses. 63 The taxpayers were employees of the United
States Department of Agriculture's Forest Service. The Fores~ Service required the employees, who worked in national forests in
Fresno and Tuolumne Counties, California, to live in the houses, located in the forests. The Forest Service deducted from its employees' salaries an amount corresponding to the fair rental value of
similar housing in the private sector. 64 The Forest Service employees, joined by the United States, brought suit against the two
counties, contending that the taxes interfered with a federal function
and discriminated against federal employees and, thus, offended the
supremacy clause of the Constitution. 65
The trial court sustained the taxpayers' claims on the ground that
they had no taxable possessory interest under state law, 66 but the
intermediate appellate court reversed, holding that the taxpayers did
in fact have such an interest in the federally owned houses. 67 The appellate court went on to reject the contentions that the assessments
interfered with a federal function and that they discriminated against
the federal government or its employees. 68
63. Local California taxing bodies are authorized to impose an annual use or
property tax on possessory interests in publicly owned tax-exempt realty. All property in California not exempt by federal or state law is subject to such taxation.
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE•§ 201 (West 1970). A" 'taxable possessory interest' means
a possessory interest in nontaxable publicly owned real property, as such property
is defined in section 104 of the Revenue and Taxation Code." CAL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 18, § 21(b) (1975). Section 104 provides that real property includes "[t]he
possession of, claim to, ownership of, or right to the possession of land." CAL. REV.
& TAX CoDE § 104 (West 1970). CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 107 (West 1970)
states that "possessory interest" means "[p]ossession of, claim to, or right to the
possession of land or improvements, except when coupled with ownership of the land
or improvements in the same person."
64. The Forest Service viewed the occupancy of these houses as partial compensation for the services of its employees and made a deduction from an employee's
salary for each two-week pay period in which the employee occupied such a house:
The Forest Service fixed the amount of the deduction by estimating the fair
rental value of a similar house in the private sector and then discounting that
figure to take account of the distance between the Forest Service house and
the nearest establisp.ed community and the absence, if any, of any customary
amenities in or near the house. Adjustment was also made for the fact that
the Forest Service reserved the right to remove employees from their houses at
any time, to enter the houses with or without notice for inspection purposes, and
to use part or all of the houses for official purposes in emergency.
97 S. Ct. at 700-01 (footnote omitted).
65. Both counties computed the amount of the employees' possessory interests
based on the estimated fair rental values of the houses. Values were determined
by considering essentially the same factors used by the Forest Service in setting fair
rental amounts. 97 S. Ct. at 701; see note 64 supra.
66. 50 Cal. App. 3d 633, 637, 123 Cal. Rptr. 548, 549 (1975).
67. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 639-40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 551-52.
68. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 640-41, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 552. The court cited the
Supreme Court's decisions in City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 335 U.S. 489 (1958),
United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958), and United States
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The Supreme Court might well have affirmed the state court's
decision in a brief per curiam opinion. It had squarely held in
United States v. City of Detroit69 and United States v. Township of
Muskegon70 that the supremacy clause was no bar to the imposition
of a state tax upon a commercial lessee or user of federally owned
property "in the same amount and to the same extent as though the
lessee or user were the owner of such property." 71 The Michigan
court in those cases, like the California court here, had construed
the state statute as imposing a tax on the lessee or user and not on
the federal government, 72 even though in both instances the tax was
measured by the value of the federal government's property. Indeed,
the California taxes seemed to rest on safer grounds than did those
of Michigan, for the latter were measured by the fee value of the
federal property leased or used by the taxpayer, whereas in County
of Fresno the tax was measured only by the value of the lessee's
possessory interest in such property. 73 Furthermore, in Township
of Muskegon, the Court refused to deny the states the power to tax
merely because the property was being used by a government contractor in the performance of government contracts. 74 Such a burden on a "federal function" was not of constitutional magnitude.
Finally, since the Court had previously abandoned the "economic
burden" test as a criterion for determining the scope of the federal
government's immunity from state taxation, 75 it was of no consequence that the federal government might in fact absorb the financial
impact of the state levy, as it did in City of Detroit76 though not,
apparently, in County of Fresno. 77
The Court in County of Fresno did affirm, but not simply on
the authority of those precedents. Instead, it returned to the source,
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 78 in an apparent effort to rationalize the
v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958). The California Supreme Court denied
review of the intermediate appellate court decision. See 91 S. Ct. at 702.
69. 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
70. 355 U.S. 484 (1958).
71. 6 MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 7.7(5), 7.7(6) (Cum. Supp. 1957), quoted in 355
U.S. 467-68 n.1.
12. See United States v. City of Detroit, 345 Mich. 601, 605-12, 77 N.W.2d 79,
81-84 (1956); Township of Muskegon v. Continental Motors Corp., 346 Mich. 218,
222, 77 N.W.2d 799, 801 (1956).
73. See note 65 supra; text at note 71 supra.
74. 355 U.S. at 486-87.
15. See United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. at 472-73; Kern-Limerick,
Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954); Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1
(1941).
76. 355 U.S. at 468.
11. See 91 S. Ct. at 705.
78. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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analytical framework for determining the scope of the constitutional
immunity of federal instrumentalities from state taxation. In
M'Culloch, the Court confronted a Maryland tax levied' on notes
issued by any bank not chartered by the state. 79 No equivalent levy
was imposed on Maryland banks. The only bank in Maryland actually fitting the statutory description was the Bank of the United
States, created and incorporated by an act of Congress. In Chief
Justice Marshall's landmark opinion, the Court held that Congress
had constitutional authority to create the Bank and that Maryland's
levy upon it was invalid under the supremacy clause:
The question is, in truth, a question of supremacy; and if the right
of the States to tax the means employed by the general government
be conceded, the declaration that the constitution, and the laws
made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land,
is empty and unmeaning declamation. 80
In reexamining M'Culloch, however, the Court found that the
principles of federal. supremacy there elaborated were tempered by
other considerations. The Court in County of Fresno adverts to the
familiar language that the power to tax -involves the power to destroy,
but it emphasized those passages in M'Culloch suggesting that in the
proper circumstances the states may be permitted to exercise their tax
power without fear of abuse. Specifically, the County of Fresno
opinion stresses Marshall's rejection of the argument made by Maryland that the states should be trusted not to abuse their power to tax a
federal function just as they must be trusted not to abuse their power
to tax their own citizens:
The [M'Culloch] Court rejected the argument because the political check against abuse of the power to tax a State's constituents
is absent when the state taxes only a federal function. A State's
constituents can be relied on to vote out of office any legislature
that imposes an abusively high tax on them. They cannot be
relied upon to be similarly motivated when the tax is instead
solely on a federal function. 81
But the political ~heck found lacking in M'Culloch, where the tax
was imposed solely on the Bank of the United States, "is present
where the State imposes a nondiscriminatory tax only on its constituents or their artificially owned entities,'' 82 some of whom may be engaged in a federal function.
The Court in County of Fresno likewise underscored a further, related qualification of M'Culloch: as Marshall himself acknowledged,
79.
80.
81.
82,

17
17
97
97

U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 320-21.
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 433.
S. Ct. at 702-03 (footnote omitted).
S. Ct. at 705 (footnote omitted).
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the decision did not "extend to a tax . . . imposed on the interest
which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this institution [the
bank], in common with other property of the same description
throughout the State." 83
By stressing these two limiting elements of M'Culloch, the Court
put a new face on this venerable case. Whatever its broad implications regarding the immunity that the federal government and its instrumentalities enjoy from state taxation, the case also stands for the
limiting principle that the supremacy clause prohibits taxation of
those who deal with the federal government only insofar as it
discriminates against them because of their relationship with the federal government. Thus, the Court now emphasized, "McCulloch
foresaw the unfairness in forcing a State to exempt private individuals with beneficial interests in federal property from taxes imposed
on similar interests held by others in private property," 84 and it "expressly excluded from its rule a tax on 'interests which the citizens
of Maryland may hold [in a federal instrumentality] in common with
other property of the same description throughout the State.' " 85
The Court was therefore able to conclude in the County of Fresno
case that the "rule" to be derived from its more recent decisions,
which returned to the "original intent" of M'Culloch, was that "the
economic burden on a federal function of a state tax imposed on
those who deal with the Federal Government does not render the
tax unconstitutional so long as the tax is imposed equally on the other
similarly situated constituents of the State." 86
Having determined that the critical issue in the case was whether
the California levy discriminated against the federal government or
those associated with it (since there was no question that the "legal
incidence" of the tax fell neither on the United States nor its property), the Court found that resolution followed easily. The levy did
not tax federal employees living in federally owned houses differently from state employees living in state-owned houses. 87 Nor did
the tax single out lessees of tax-exempt property for discriminatory
treatment by imposing on them a tax not borne by other lessees.
Even though, as to private property, owners and not lessees are
taxed, those who rent houses in the private sector would presumably
83. 97 S.
original)).
84. 97 S.
85. 97 S.
at 436).
86. 97 S.
87. 97 S.

Ct. at 703 (quoting 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) (emphasis
Ct. at 705.
Ct. at 105 (bracketed material original) (quoting 17 U.S. (4 Wheat,)
Ct. at 704-05 (footnote omitted).
Ct. at 706 n.13.
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bear the economic burden of the tax imposed on their lessors.88
And the decisions in City of Detroit and Township of Muskegon,
which had seemed controlling from the outset89 and upon which the
Court ultimately relied, 90 were not drained of force simply because
they involved property employed for business rather than personal
use-a difference the Court termed "inconsequential."91 Rather,
County of Fresno reaffirms and strengthens these decisions by supplying a doctrinal underpinning reaching into the bedrock of supremacy clause analysis.
In sustaining the California possessory ·interest tax, the Court in
County of Fresno, as in Michelin, thus relied principally on the conclusion that the levy did not discriminate against or impose a special
burden upon the constitutionally protected interest at issue. There
are, however, important differences between the two decisions that
should not be overlooked. First, the Court in County of Fresno explicitly adhered to the doctrine that the "states may not impose taxes
directly on the Federal Government, nor may they impose taxes the
legal incidence of which falls on the Federal Govemment," 92 regardless of the nondiscriminatory character of the levy. Thus the Court
did not embrace the nondiscrimination principle in the context of
state taxation of federal instrumentalities as fully as it did in the context of state taxation of imports. Yet M'Culloch no less than Brown
would have justified a broader holding. For the M'Culloch opinion
had stated that the decision did "not extend to a tax paid by the real
property of the bank, in common with other real property within the
State." 93 On that assumption, it was not merely nondiscriminatory
state taxation of the beneficial interests of private parties in federal
property that fell outside the "original intent" of M'Culloch; 94 it was
also nondiscriminatory state taxation of the federal property itself.
Yet the Court was unwilling (in part, perhaps, because it was unnecessary) to extend its reasoning to such an exaction. 95
The second, more critical, distinction relates to the actual effect
of the tax. The Court's conclusion in County of Fresno that the state
tax did not discriminate against the federal government is open to
serious question, while there could have been no comparable objec88. 97 S. Ct. at 706. Even on this assumption, it may still be argued, as did
Justice Stevens in dissent, that the possessory interest levy nevertheless effectively
discriminated against federal employees. See text at notes 96-98 infra.
89. See text at notes 69-77 supra.
90. 97 S. Ct. at 706-07.
91. 97 S. Ct. at 707.
92. 97 S. Ct. at 703 (emphasis added).
93. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436.
94. 97 S. Ct. at 704-05.
95. But see text preceding note 156 and at note 157 infra.
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tion to the Court's conclusion with regard to the imports at issue in
In his dissent to County of Fresno, the only dissenting
vote in the three cases examined by this Article, Justice Stevens argued that the California possessory interest tax discriminated against
the federal employees in two respects. First, he disagreed with the
majority's assumption that the positions of the government employees
and of the lessees of nonexempt property are equalized by the
private landlords' passing their property tax burden onto their
tenants. 96 On the assumption that the private lessor's tax burden
was passed through to his lessee, Justice Stevens noted that the fair
market value of a lease would incorporate some amount representing
the property tax burden. 97 This fair market value is used by the
federal government to determine the amount deducted from its employees' wages as rent for use of the government-owned houses, without any apparent adjustment to reflect the federal government's exemption from state property tax. Hence, the federal employees, in
effect, bear a heavier tax burden than tenants of private lessors:
they pay, like tenants of private lessors, a fair market rental that reflects, in part, the private lessor's tax burden; but unlike other lessees,
they pay an additional tax to the state. 98
Stevens also objected to the tax on the ground that it discriminated between lessees of publicly owned tax-exempt property
and lessees of other exempt property who were not subject to the
tax. 99 He pointed out that the possessory interest tax applies only
to "publicly owned real property," not to all tax-exempt property.100
Michelin.

96. 97 S. Ct. at 708 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. The portion of the property tax passed on to the tenant might vary with
market conditions. See 97 S. Ct. at 708.
98. Because the federal government is under no legal obligation to pay state taxes,
it is in a position to receive higher net rents than those received by private landlords,
whose gross rentals are reduced by their state tax liabilities. See 97 S. Ct. at 708
n.4. Contrast the situation of the Forest Service lessees with that of the government's tenant in United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958). In that
case, the lease contract provided that a tenant could deduct from the rental charge
any taxes paid on account of the leasehold property. 355 U.S. at 468. Justice
Stevens did not believe, however, that the ability of the federal government to .shield
its employees from the impact of taxes by making such a rent adjustment provided
any justification for the levy: "I do not believe that the State's power can be exercised in a manner which requires the Federal Government to surrender its own tax
exemption in order to protect its employees from a discriminatory tax." 97 S. Ct.
at 709 n.5.
Justice Stevens also observed that reimbursement would impose on the federal
government not merely the economic burden represented by the value of taxes, see
text at note 76 supra, but also "[t]he administrative burden of determining the correct amount of tax owed on each unique residence operating under myriad payment
systems and due dates." 97 S. Ct. at 709 n.5.
99. 97 S. Ct. at 709.
100. 97 s. Ct at 709 (in part quoting CAL. Al>MIN. CoDB tit. 18, § 21(b)
(1975)),
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It appeared to Justice Stevens that the only persons other than the
federal employees liable for the tax were state employees living in
state-owned houses. 101 Yet, the State of California, and its political
subdivisions, can readily adjust the rent charged to their tenantemployees to compensate for the tax. Consequently, in Stevens'
view, "the tax may have a practical effect on the Federal Government and its employees which is different from its effect on the
owners or users of any other tax-exempt property in the State."102
Justice Stevens was unable to persuade a single colleague to join
him in these views. His dissent demonstrates, however, that discrimination is a malleable concept that will not necessarily reveal
bright lines discernible to all observers. More specifically, his dissent identifies a major problem with the majority's approach to the
factual issue of discrimination. If, as suggested in more detail
below, 103 the Supreme Court may be moving toward the view that
the question of discrimination is the central issue in determining the
constitutionality of the exercise of state tax power under the importexport, supremacy, and commerce clauses, the Court must determine
how closely it will look at a state tax in ascertaining whether there
is evidence of discrimination. The majority in County of Fresno
focused primarily on the formal language of the statutory pro:visions
to determine whether the levy discriminated against those who deal
with the federal government. The alternative approach, exemplified
by Stevens' dissent, is to consider the effect of the tax as implemented by the state. Thus, Stevens directed attention to the narrow
base of the tax and to the possible disparate economic impact of the
tax on federal and state employees. 104 Ultimately, it is the nature
of the inquiry that the Court undertakes that will determine the extent to which the nondiscrimination criterion will protect the interests
the supremacy clause was designed to serve.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady105
In Complete Auto Transit, as in Michelin and County of Fresno,
C.

101. 97 S. Ct. at 709. Presumably, municipal employees living in municipally
owned houses would also be subject to the tax, at least to the extent that such municipally owned houses were themselves tax exempt.
102. 97 S. Ct. at 709.
103. See text preceding note 135 infra and accompanying and following note
136 infra.
104. The restricted !lPPlication of the tax-imposing liability only for users of
publicly owned real property-appears on the face of the statute. The examination
of the economic impact of the tax-including, most critically, the recognition that
the state may well adjust the rents charged its own employees--evidences a more
detailed analysis focused on actual effects.
105. 97 S. Ct. 1076 (1977). The following discussion draws freely from my
article, supra note 3,
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the Court reexamined old doctrine and concluded that the purposes
of a constitutional restraint on state taxation would not be furthered
by proscribing the nondiscriminatory levy at issue. The decision indicates that the commerce clause, like the import-export clause and
the supremacy clause, is to be viewed as restraining the exercise of
state tax power without creating a broad zone of tax immunity for
the constitutionally protected interest.
The case involved a Mississippi tax "for the privilege of engaging
or continuing in business or doing business within this state,"100
levied upon every person operating a "transportation business for the
transportation of persons or property for compensation or hire between points within this State.mo 7 The tax was measured by the
gross receipts from the business.108 The taxpayer's Mississippi
operations consisted of hauling motor vehicles to dealers in the state
from a railroad depot in Jackson, Mississippi, where they had been
shipped from out-of-state assembly plants. 109 The vehicles were
normally loaded on Complete's trucks and delivered to Mississippi
dealers within forty-eight hours after arrival in Jackson. 11° Complete alleged that its transportation services were an integral part of
an interstate movement so that the imposition of the tax violated the
commerce clause. 111 Its claim was predicated soiely on the fact that
the levy was imposed on the "privilege of doing interstate business,"112 which the Court had long held to be immune from state
taxation under the commerce clause, 11 3 In light of the assumption
made both by the Mississippi courts and the Supreme Court that the
transportation services under consideration constituted interstate
rather than intrastate commerce, 114 the taxpayer's contention-at
least on its face-did not lack force. Yet the true nature of the issue
confronting the Supreme Court after the state courts sustained the
assessments cannot be fully appreciated without some essential background.
One of the fundamentals of commerce clause doctrine was that
an enterprise doing exclusively interstate business could not constitutionally be subjected to a state tax imposed on the privilege of doing
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

MISS. CoDB ANN. § 27-65-13(2) (1972) quoted in 91 S. Ct. at 1077.
Miss. CooB ANN. § 27-65-19(2) (1972) quoted in 97 S. Ct. at 1077.
Miss. CODB .ANN. § 27-65-19(2) (1972) quoted in 97 s. Ct. at 1077.
97 S. Ct. at 1077.
97 S. Ct. at 1077.
97 S. Ct. at 1071!.
Brief for Appellant at 20-27.
See W. Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 177-80.
See 9-1 S. Ct. at 1077 n.4,
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business in that state. 115 The principle grew out of a logical-but
not necessary116-inference the Court drew from the proposition
that the commerce clause preclu~ed a state from preventing an outof-state corporation from engaging in interstate business within
its borders. 117 Thus, the Court long ago held that a state cannot
impose a tax or fee upon a foreign corporation as a condition to commencing business in the state118 and then extended the principle to
forbid a tax on the privilege of doing business, as applied to a foreign
corporation doing exclusively i,nterstate business in the taxing state,
even though the tax was not levied as a condition to commencing
business. 119 It made no difference that both foreign and domestic
corporations and both interstate and intrastate business were taxed
on a nondiscriminatory basis. 120
Over the years, however, as judicial attitudes toward state tax
power became more generous, significant inroads were made on the
doctrine that the privilege of doing interstate business was immune
from state taxation. By identifying "local incidents" of interstate
business, which the states could properly tax, the Court chipped away
at the scope of the privilege. 121 Without explicitly abandoning the
privilege concept, the Court developed the multiple taxation doctrine
that undermined the basis for the tax immunity122 and led to distinctions between cases that became increasingly gossamer.128 In
addition, the Court appeared to sanction state taxation of exclusively
interstate business in several decisions summarily affirming state court
rulings.124
115. See Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389, 393
(1952); General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commn., 322 U.S. 335, 338 _(1944); At-,
lantic & Pac. Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160, 162 (1903).
116. See J. Hellerstein, State Franchise Taxation of Interstate Business, 4 TAX
L. REv. 95, 99 (1948).
117. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1877);
cf. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 37 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (notes cases holding that a business organized in one state that is engaged
in interstate commerce cannot be compelled by a second state to qualify under its
requirements to carry on business). 118. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 215 U.S. 1, 4748 (1910); Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640,645 (1888).
119. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 217 (1925);
Cheney Bros. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1918). See J. Hellerstein,
supra note 116, at 99.
·
120. See sources cited in note 11-9 supra.
121. See, e.g., Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948); Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938).
122. J. Hellerstein, supra note 116, at 101-02 & n.27.
123. Compare, e.g., Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157
(1954), with Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949).
124. See, e.g., Field Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 47 Wash. 2d 852, 289 P.2d 1010
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These developments reached their climax in Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota 12 r, and Colonial Pipeline, Inc. v.
Traigle. 126 In Northwestern, the Court held that the commerce
clause did not preclude a state from imposing a fairly apportioned,
nondiscriminatory net income tax upon an out-of-state corporation
engaged exclusively in interstate commerce in the taxing state. At
the same time, however, the Court reaffirmed its decision in Spector
Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 127 where it had invalidated a Connecticut tax similar in virtually every respect to the tax at issue in
Northwestern except that it was levied on the privilege of doing business in the state. The distinction the Court perceived between the two
cases was that the formal subject of the tax128 in Northwestern was
the corporation's net income, whereas in Spector it was the privilege
of doing business. Since. the measure of the levies at issue in both
Spector and Northwestern was the corporation's net income, the immunity that exclusively interstate commerce enjoyed from state taxation apparently depended on whether the legislative draftsmen called
the tax by the right name.
In Colonial, the Court again demonstrated that the protection
afforded the interstate enterprise by the tax-immune privilege of
doing business was feeble at best. The taxpayer, an interstate pipeline conducting an exclusively interstate business in the state, was
held taxable for the privilege of doing business in corporate form,
which the Court found distinguishable from a forbidden levy on the
privilege of doing business. The case presented a particularly
dramatic illustration of the illusory character of the privilege concept
(1955), affd. per curiam, 352 U.S. 806 (1956); West Pub. Co. v. McColgan, 28
Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861, affd. per curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
125. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
126. 421 U.S. 100 (1975).
127. 340 U.S. 602 (1951). The Northwestern Court cited Spector in stating
that it was "beyond dispute that a State may not lay a tax on the 'privilege' of
engaging in interstate commerce." 358 U.S. at 458.
128. The subject is the legal incidence of a tax; it is the thing or event upon
which the power to tax is based. The measure of a tax is the yardstick to which
the rate is applied. Subject and measure may be distinct, as in a privilege tax, where
the subject is the privilege and the measure is, for example, income; or subject and
measure may coincide, as in an income tax, where the income is both the subject
upon which the tax power is predicated and the basis upon which the amount due
is calculated. It is the subject of a tax which has constitutional significance. The
measure, at least in theory, has not presented constitutional questions. See, e.g.,
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22, 26-27 (1937); Kansas City, F. S. & M.
Ry. v. Botkin, 24.0 U.S. 227, 233 (1916). But the Court has occasionally attributed
constitutional import to the measure of a tax by obscuring the distinction between
subject and measure. See, e.g., Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S.
434, 438-40 (1939); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes & Assessments,
280 U.S. 338, 348-49 (1930).
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because the same taxpayer had successfully resisted imposition of an
earlier version of virtually the identical levy that had been imposed
on the privilege of doing business rather than the doing of business
in corporate form. With a minimum of wordsmithing the state legislature was able to deprive the taxpayer of its tax immunity, thereby
giving credence to Justice Blackmun's remark that the Court was
putting its imprimatur upon "-taxation by semantics."129
Thus when the Court in Complete Auto Transit was "[o]nce
again . . . presented with ' "the perennial problem of the validity
of a state tax for the privilege of carrying on, within a state, certain
activities" relating to a corporation's operation of an interstate business,' "130 the- tax-immune privilege of doing interstate business was
at most a narrowly confined restraint on the exercise of state power.
And it therefore came as no surprise when the Supreme Court upheld the application of Mississippi's tax to the receipts from Complete's transportation services. But this time the Court did not
simply seize upon yet another "local incident'' in some way distinguishable from the privilege of doing interstate business as a
predicate for sustaining the tax. Instead, it overruled Spector; flatly
repudiated the privilege concept altogether, along with the philosophy underlying it; declared that the commerce clause is no bar to
a nondiscriminatory, fairly apportioned levy imposed upon a taxpayer
carrying on an interstate business in the taxing state; and made it
clear that the clause has not created an irreducible zone of -tax immunity unrelated to its purposes.
The Court traced the modem origin of the privilege doctrine to
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Freeman v. Hewit, 131 which reflected;
"an underlying philosophy that interstate commerce should enjoy a
sort of 'free trade' immunity from state taxation. " 132 It described
the gradual erosion of the doctrine in face of the emerging principle
that a tax would be sustained against a commerce clause challenge
so long as it is "applied to an activity with a ~ubstantial nexus with
the taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against
interstate commerce, and is fairly related to services provided by the
State."133 And it concluded:
Not only has the philosophy underlying the rule been rejected,
but the rule itself has been stripped of any practical significance.
129. 421 U.S. at 115 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
130. 97 S. Ct. at 1076 (quoting Colonial Pipeline, Inc. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100,
101 (1975), quoting Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 85 (1948)).
131. 329' U.S. 249 (1946).
132. 97 S. Ct. at 1078 (footnote omitted).
133. 97 S. Ct. at 1079. See 91 S. Ct. at 1079-83; see also text at notes 11529 supra.
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If Mississippi had called its tax one on "net income" or on the

"going concern value" of appellant's business, the Spector rule
could not invalidate it. There is no economic consequence that
follows necessarily from the use of the particular words, "privilege
of doing business," and a focus on that formalism merely obscures
the question whether the tax produces a forbidden effect. Simply
put, the Spector rule does not address the problems with which
the Commerce Clause is concerned. Accordingly, we now reject
the rule of Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor . . . that
a state tax on the "privilege of doing business" is per se unconstitutional when it is applied to interstate commerce, and that case
is overruled.134

As in Michelin and County of Fresno, once the applicable
principles were established, decision followed easily. Since the only
objection to the application of Mississippi's tax to Complete's activities in the state was that it was imposed on the privilege of doing
interstate business, the tax had, with the overruling of Spector, become unobjectionable. In sum, the Court once again reevaluated prior
doctrine and announced a principle of constitutional adjudication designed to safeguard the protected interest without creating a broad
area of tax immunity.

II. TOWARD A MORE UNIFIED APPROACH TO
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION OF STATE TAX QUESTIONS
In three decisions rendered in the space of little over a year, the
Supreme Court has taken a more unified and systematic approach
than in the past to the interpretation of constitutional limitations on
state taxation bearing on the allocation of powers between the state
and national governments. In each case, a different constitutional
restraint was the basis of a challenge to a state tax levy. In each
case, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, and, in so doing,
either repudiated or limited prior doctrine that had once been used
to carve out a broad zone of tax immunity for interests protected by
the constitutional provision in question. And, in each case, the
Court's opinion can fairly be read as stressing a common doctrinal
theme: so long as the state tax does not discriminate against or impose special burdens upon the constitutionally protected interest, the
tax will be sustained. The protection that the import-export, commerce, and supremacy clauses accord to imports, commerce, and the
federal government provides immunity from state taxation only to
the extent necessary to avoid discrimination against or the imposition
of special burdens upon the protected interest.
134. 97 S. Ct. at 1083-84 (footnote omitted).
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In Michelin, the Court disentangled itself from the thorny problem of locating imported goods in time and space in the context of
their intended use to determine whether they. had retained their distinctive character as imports. Instead, the Court's opinion makes it
clear that the central question in such cases is whether the exaction
at issue discriminates against imported goods on the basis of their
foreign origin.135 In Complete Auto Transit, the Court similarly reformulated the framework for analyzing the constitutionality of a
state tax on an interstate business in cases arising under the commerce clause. No longer will courts be concerned with the question
whether a tax is imposed on the privilege of doing interstate business. Instead, the Court's opinion makes it clear that the central
question in such cases is whether the tax is nondiscriminatory. 136
The County of Fresno Court did not explicitly restructure the decisionmaking framework for determining the constitutionality of a state
tax on a federal instrumentality in cases arising under the supremacy
clause, but it did place renewed emphasis upon one aspect of the constitutional analysis. On the assumption that the levy is not imposed
directly on the United States and that its legal incidence does not
fall on the federal government, the Court's opinion makes it clear
that the central question in such cases is whether the tax discriminates against the federal government or its instrumentalities and
those who deal with them.
It is important to recognize, of course, that the Court did not exalt
the nondiscrimination principle into the exclusive criterion by which
the constitutionality of state taxes would be determined under the
three clauses at issue. Michelin qualifies the nondiscrimination doctrine by disapproving even nondiscriminatory taxes on goods in
transit, for such a tax would threaten to saddle imports with burdens
not necessarily borne by domestic products.137 Complete Auto
Transit does not disturb the requirements that the taxed enterprise
have some nexus with the taxing state and that the tax be fairly apportioned to the activities carried on there. 138 Finally, County of
Fresno reasserted the important qualification of the nondiscrimina135. This is not to suggest that discrimination is the exclusive criterion by which
the constitutionality of such a tax will be determined under the import-export clause.
See text at notes 44 supra and 137 infra.
136. This is not to suggest that discrimination is the exclusive criterion by which
the constitutionality of such a tax will be determined under the commerce clause.
See text at notes 133 supra and 138 infra.
137. See text at note 44 supra. The doctrinal basis for proscription of a nondiscriminatory tax on imported goods is obscure. See W. Hellerstein, supra note 6,
at 116.
138. See text at note 133 supra.
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tion doctrine that a tax whose legal incidence falls on the United
States or its property is, ipso facto, invalid.139
These qualifications notwithstanding, the import of these cases
is to make it clear that the relevant constitutional provisions-the
import-export clause, the commerce clause, and the supremacy
clause--do not completely shelter certain property or activities from
state taxation, as it was once thought they did. To be sure, since
state taxation of imports, of interstate commerce, or of those who
deal with the federal government may trench on the domain of
powers that are allocated to the national government under the
clauses in question, the interests that these clauses were designed to
protect are still accorded constitutional solicitude. But the level
of protection has been reduced from an impregnable zone of immunity to essentially a guarantee of nondiscriminatory treatment.
The Court's emphasis upon the nondiscrimination principle as a
basis for adjudicating controversies over the exercise of state tax
power under the import-export, commerce, and supremacy clauses
raises the possibility that these cases share an additional element of
doctrinal consistency. It may be suggested that the Court, in viewing
the clauses under consideration as designed principally to shield certain national interests from abusive state legislation, is manifesting
an increased willingness to rely upon the restraining influence of the
democratic political process to achieve this purpose. In County of
Fresno the Court explicitly adverted to this notion that the political
process can be relied upon to guard against abusive state taxation
of the protected federal interests. 140 This theory, as the Court observed in County of Fresno, is not a novel idea; 141 it was clearly anticipated by Chief Justice Marshall in M'Culloch v. Maryland:
The only security against the abuse of [the] power [to tax]
is found in the structure of the government itself. In imposing a
tax the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general,
a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.
The people of a state, therefore, give to their government a right
of taxing themselves and their property, and as the exigencies· of
government cannot be limited, ·they prescribe no limits to the exercise of this right, resting confidently on the interest of the legislator,
and on the influence of the constituent over their representatives,
to guard them against its abuse. But the means employed by the
government of the Union have no such security ...•142
Indeed, Marshall seemed prepared to carry the theory further than
139.
140.
141.
142.

97 S. Ct. at 703.
97 S. Ct. 669, 704-05 & n.11.
See 91 S. Ct. at 702-03.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 428 (emphasis original),
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the Court has ever gone. His statement that the M'Culloch decision
does not apply to a tax on the national bank's real property, or to
a tax on the interests of its investors levied "in common with other
property of the same description throughout the state,"143 intimates
that, where the tax is nondiscriminatory such that the federal interest
enjoys the full measure of protection inhering in the political
process, the tax does not violate the supremacy clause. 144 Although
the Court has repeatedly held that a tax is invalid if its legal incidence falls on the federal government, whether or not the tax is discriminatory, the County of Fresno case may presage the Court's willingness to reopen this question.145
Recognition of the political check as a mechanism for protecting
federal interests has been clearest in supremacy clause analysis. 146
143. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436.
144. The Court's reliance upon a "political check" as a safeguard against the
abuse of state tax power helps clarify the significance of Justice Stevens' dispute
with the majority in County of Fresno. Such reliance is premised on the theory
that a tax imposed on those engaged in the federally protected activity will not exceed
the bounds of reasonableness if legislators must impose the same burden on their
own constituents. But this "political check" induces restraint only if the onus of
the tax borne by nonlocal interests is likewise borne by a substantial segment of
the electorate. Examining the "actual effects" of the tax, as Justice Stevens did
in his County of Fresno dissent, represents an effort to evaluate the strength of
the political restraint. It will be recalled that he found that the burden of California's possessory interest tax was unlikely to fall on any analogous group to which
the state government was responsive or with respect to which it could not make
some compensating adjustment. Thus, there was, in Justice Stevens' view, no assurance that the federal employees would be protected by any local political restraint.
In contrast, the majority, while invoking the principle that the existence of a
political check upon the exercise of state tax power will safeguard the constitutionally
protected interest, 97 S. Ct. at 704-05, nevertheless was content to rely primarily
upon the formal equality provided by the state's statutory scheiµe without critically
examining the actual impact of the levy upon persons to whom the legislature is
politically accountable. If the Court subscribes to the view that, left unchecked,
the states cannot be trusted to subordinate local to national interests, and if it is
looking to the restraints inherent in the political process as furnishing the necessary
check, it is incumbent upon the Court to verify that the political restraint is not
a spurious one.
145. See § III infra.
146. The Court has also adverted to the inherent protection afforded by the political process in striking down discriminatory state taxation under the privileges and
immunities clause of article IV:
The Privileges and Immunities Clause, by making noncitizenship or nonresidence
an improper basis for locating a special burden, implicates not only the individual's right to nondiscriminatory treatment but also, perhaps more so, the
structural balance essential to the concept of federalism. Since nonresidents are
not represented in the taxing State's legislative halls, . . • judicial acquiescence
in taxation schemes that burden them particularly would remit them to such
redress as they could secure through their own State • • • •
·
Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 (1975) (emphasis added). Cf. Allied
Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 533 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring) (state
tax discriminating in favor of out-of-state business is valid under the equal protection
clause; the clause need not be applied mechanically to give residents the same protection afforded nonresidents with respect to state taxing schemes).
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The theory might, however, play some role in the analysis of state
tax legislation under the commerce and import-export clauses in light
of the increased weight the Court has placed upon the nondiscrimination principle. It has been observed that it is
relevant to inquire whether [a] tax is subject to local political check
and is comparable in its effect to the taxes imposed by the state
on other business. If the incidence of a tax falls to a significant
degree on persons to whom the legislature is politically responsible,
i.e., local voters, it is possible that the burden of the tax and hence
perhaps its deleterious effect on interstate commerce will be less
than might otherwise be the case. 147

And the Court itself has remarked in upholding state regulatory
legislation over commerce clause objections that "[t]he fact that [the
regulations] affect alike shippers in interstate and intrastate commerce in large number within as well as without the state is a safeguard against their abuse." 148 Conceivably the Court will pay closer
attention to the question whether state tax legislation is subject to
an effective local political check in determining whether the tax is
discriminatory under the commerce clause. 149
In view of the Court's reasoning in Michelin, it might likewise
be suggested that it is relevant to inquire whether the levy at issue
is subject to a local political check for purposes of analysis under the
import-export clause. The Court noted that one of the principal concerns of the framers in adopting the import-export clause was to
allay fears that coastal states would abuse their position to the detriment of their sister states and national policy by singling out imports
for discriminatory taxation. 150 To the extent that a tax is nondiscriminatory in its impact and falls equally on persons to whom the
state legislature is politically responsible, the restraints inherent in
the democratic process will tend to safeguard the constitutionally protected interest from abusive state taxation. 151
147. Developments in the Law-Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 15 HARV. L. REv. 953, 957 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
148. South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 161, 187
(193·8).
149. It should be noted, however, that
the degree of political influence possessed by those bearing the tax will in many
cases be only conjectural; the presence of political controls may not assure a
tax's compatibility with the notion of an open economy; and even if such controls are clearly absent, unconstitutionality is not a necessary inference, since the
tax burden may for other reasons not impede free trade.
Developments, supra note 147, at 957-58.
150. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. at 283-86, 289-90.
151. It should be pointed out, however, that, although Chief Justice Marshall indicated in Brown that the fears to which the Court later adverted in Michelin repre•
sented one of the motivations behind the adoption of the import-export clause, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 439, he did not draw the inference, as he had in M'Cul/och, that
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Needless to say, there are obvious dangers in attempting, as
above, to generalize broadly from a mere triad of cases. Nevertheless, it is significant that, in all three cases, the Court, with virtual
unanimity, 152 was willing to look past recent precedent and to reacquaint itself with the underlying purposes of the constitutional prohibitions with which it was dealing. Thus, in returning to the fundamental objectives of the import-export and supremacy clauses, the
Court drew sustenance for its constitutional analysis from its landmark decisions in Brown v. Maryland and M'Culloch v. Maryland.
Moreover, the Court's willingness to discard prior doctrine and to restructure its analysis of problems that have confronted it ( and will
no doubt continue to confront it) for years is also a telling indication
that a major shift may be taking place in the Court's attitude toward
those limitations on state tax power involved in the three recent cases
under consideration here. While neither Low v. Austin nor Spector
Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor seriously inhibited the exercise of
state tax power, they were monuments to a certain way of thinking
about the constitutional limitations on state taxation, and their overruling should be viewed in that light. And it is also noteworthy that the
Court issued its opinions in these three cases through different
spokesmen-Justices Brennan, White, and Blackmun-who span
the Court's ideological spectrum on many other issues.
It is, of course, quite conceivable that the parallels between these
three cases are simply coincidental in view of their concern with distinct constitutional limitations embodying different purposes. Furthermore, the suggested interpretation of the Court's decisions is by
no means the only reading they may fairly be given. Michelin, to
be sure, marks a fundamental change in the Court's approach to the
constitutional limitations on the taxation of imports, replacing the
"original package" concept with nondiscrimination as the central criterion for determining a levy's validity under the import-export
clause. But County of Fresrw may be read as simply a reaffirmation of City of Detroit and Township of Muskegon coupled with an
explicit refusal to abandon the "legal incidence" test as a basis for
protection from the dangers of abusive state taxation might be found in the political
restraints imposed on state legislation by those to whom the legislature was politically
responsible. Rather, he concluded that the framers thought the power to levy imposts
or duties on imports was one "which no State ought to exercise." 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) at 440.
152. The single dissent in the three cases was Justice Stevens' opinion in County
of Fresno. See text preceding note 96 supra and text at notes 96-104 supra. Justice
White separately concurred in the Michelin decision. In a brief statement, he expressed the view that it was unnecessary to overrule Low v. Austin since the tires
had lost their character as imports and thus were taxable under prior doctrine. 423
U.S. at 302.
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determining the validity of a state tax upon a federal instrumentality
under the supremacy clause. And Complete Auto Transit may be
viewed as no more than the doctrinal recognition of what was plain
to any observer-that the commerce clause did not bar the states
from imposing a nondiscriminatory, fairly apportioned tax upon an
exclusively interstate business with a sufficient nexus with the state.
Nevertheless, the consistency in the reasoning, tone, and results in
these three cases provides a basis for suggesting that the Court is
in fact adopting a more coherent approach to the restraints imposed
on state tax power by the import-export, commerce, and supremacy
clauses.
Finally, it should be recognized that, even if the Court is in the
process of developing a more systematic approach to state taxation
under these three clauses, the results in subsequent cases involving
such issues will not necessarily be substantially different than if they
had been decided under prior doctrine. Indeed, it is quite likely
that the result in both Michelin and Complete Auto Transit would
have been the same under the "original package" and "privilege"
doctrines. 153 Moreover, the propounding of new doctrine does not
remove uncertainty as to how cases will be decided under it. Justice Stevens' opinion in County of Fresno demonstrates that the
factual determination whether a particular tax discriminates against
or imposes a special burden upon the protected interest is subject
to varying interpretations, although, inasmuch as his was the lone dissent, one might suspect that this problem will not trouble the Court
in the near future. In addition, the decisions leave open certain
issues where the nondiscrimination doctrine is subject to qualification.154 Nonetheless, the Court's apparent embrace of the nondiscrimination principle as a critical-if not the critical-touchstone for
determining the constitutionality of a state tax under the importexport, supremacy, and commerce clauses is a noteworthy development.
Ill.

A

POSTSCRIPT: STATE TAXATION OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The most striking qualification of the nondiscrimination doctrine
reflected in the three cases under consideration is contained in
County of Fresrw: a state tax whose legal incidence falls on the
153. The decisions by the state courts, which were affirmed on other grounds
by the Supreme Court, were based on the Court's prior doctrines. -See Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 233 Ga. 712, 214 S.E.2d 349 (1975); Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 330 So. 2d 268 (Miss. 1976).
154. See text at notes 137-39 supra.
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United States or its property is barred by the supremacy clause regardless of whether it discriminates against or imposes a special burden upon the federal government. On this point the Court continues
to adhere to the type of rule that it discredited in Michelin and Complete Auto Transit and, indeed, to some extent in County of Fresno
itself. Yet it is conceivable that we have not heard the last from
the Court on this question. In Colonial Pipeline, it will be recalled,155 the Court went to some lengths to assert its belief in the
continuing vitality of the tax-immune privilege of doing interstate
business while rendering a decision that effectively dealt the privilege its coup de grace. A mere two years later, the Court interred
the privilege in Complete Auto Transit and cleanly broke with the
past. The analogy between Colonial and Fresno, it may be argued,
is not wholly farfetched. The Court, although affirming prior
doctrine regarding the immunity of the United States from state taxation, nevertheless renders a decision and elaborates principles
intimating that there may be little more than the weight of unexamined
precedent behind the notion that the property of the United States
itself is exempt from a nondiscriminatory tax. Indeed, if the. Court
had not quoted M'Culloch with such studied selectivity, it would have
been hard pressed to confine its reasoning to nondiscriminatory
levies imposed on interests held by private citizens in federal property. As noted earlier, M'Culloch itself stated that the opinion did
"not extend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in common
with other real property within the state,"156 which indicates that the
M'Culloch Court never intended to immunize the federal government's real property from nondiscriminatory state taxation. 157
Nevertheless, while the federal government's immunity from
state taxation may originally have been conceived as limited to discriminatory levies, 158 there is more than the weight of unexamined
precedent to explain and, indeed, justify continued adherence to
existing doctrine. One need only contemplate the prospect of
155. See text preceding note 129 supra.
156. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436.
157. At another point in his opinion, Marshall dismissed the contention that a
distinction can be made under the supremacy clause between real property and other
subjects of taxation. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 432-33. Thus, it would seem that if
"the mail," "the mint," "patent rights," "the papers of the custom house," and the
"judicial process" are encompassed within the definition of some state tax of general
applicability, the holding in M'Culloch would not extend to such an exaction.
158. Cf. Justice Marshall's comment in his dissent in First Agr. Natl. Bank v.
State Tax Commn., 392 U.S. 339, 350 (1968): "One could, and perhaps should,
read M'Culloch and Osborn [v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738
(1824)] simply for the principle that the Constitution prohibits a State from taxing
discriminatorily a federally established instrumentality."
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abandoning the rule that a nondiscriminatory tax on the United
States or its property is barred by the supremacy clause to appreciate
its virtues. What, for example, are state tax authorities to do in the
event that the federal government falls behind in its tax payments?
Traditional remedies available to enforce collection of delinquent
taxes-distraint and sale-hardly seem appropriate. And how, for
example, would a county assessor determine the value of a naval installation for the purposes of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax? Traditional valuation techniques are unlikely to yield satisfactory results. 159 Such horribles may well be imaginary, but their
specter indicates that there are cogent policy reasons for the immunity that the federal government continues to enjoy under the County
of Fresno holding. 1 6-0 Although the expanded role of the nondiscrimination principle in the analysis of the immunity of federal instrumentalities from state taxation may be a healthly development,
the M'Culloch dictum concerning nondiscriminatory taxes on federal
property may be best left unexhumed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Three recent opinions of the Supreme Court dealing with different constitutional restraints on state taxation have approached the
159. Of the three basic approaches to the valuation of real estate-market data
(based on comparable sales), capitalized net income, and reproduction cost new less
depreciation-only the cost method would appear to be applicable. See generally
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL EsTATE APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE

64-72 ( 6th ed. 1973). And it is highly questionable whether the cost of a govern•
ment facility bears any relationship to its fair market value, which is, at least in
principle, the valuation standard underlying state property tax systems. See Note,
The Road to Uniformity in Real Estate Taxation: Valuation and Appeal, 124 U. PA.
L. REV. 1418, 1430 (1976).
160. Justice Frankfurter made this point in his concurring opinions in United
States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1955), and United States v. Township of
Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1955), and in his dissenting opinion in City of Detroit
v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1955). In the City of Detroit dissent he stated:
The danger of hindrance of the Federal Government in the use of its property,
resulting in erosion of the fundamental command of the Supremacy Clause, is
at its greatest when the State may, through regulation or taxation, move directly
against the activities of the Government. . . . It is not only that the likelihood
of local legislation deliberately or unwittingly discriminatory against government
property either by its terms or application may be enhanced. Even a nondiscriminatory tax, if it is expressly laid on government property, is more likely to
result in interference with the effective use of that property, whether because of
an ill-advised attempt by the tax collector to levy on the property itself or because it is sought to hold the Government or its officers to account for the tax,
even if ultimately the endeavor may fail. The defense of sovereign immunity
to a suit against government officers for the tax, or a suit to assert title to or
recover property erroneously levied upon to satisfy a tax, may in practice be an
inadequate substitute for: the clear assertion of federal interest at the threshold.
355 U.S. at 504-05 (emphasis added). See also Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities
in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. i,. REV. 682, 700-11 and especially 704-05 & nn.
101-02 (1976).
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issue of the levy's validity in essentially the same way. In each case,
the Court's primary concern was whether the tax in question discriminated against or imposed a special burden upon the constitutionally protected interest, and, in the absence of such a finding,
the Court sustained the tax. In two of the cases, the Court flatly
repudiated prior doctrine that proscribed state taxation without regard
to whether it discriminated against or imposed a special burden upon
the protected interests; and in the third, it shifted its doctrinal emphasis so as to underscore these considerations. In view of the
hundreds of decisions the Court has handed down in this area, it
would be premature to conclude that the Court has adopted a more
unified approach to determining the constitutionality of the exercise
of state tax power under these constitutional provisions. 161 Nevertheless, there is some evidence to support such a thesis, and it is a
development that deserves acknowledgment, if not encouragement.162
161. The Court's most recent decision in the state tax field, National Geographic
Socy. v. California Bd. of Equalization, 97 S. Ct. 1386 (1977), is a reminder that
not every Supreme Court opinion addressed to constitutional limitations on state tax
power fits neatly into the analytical framework suggested in this article. In National
Geographic, the Court held that an out-of-state mail order seller maintaining two
offices in the taxing state had a sufficient nexus with the state to justify the imposition of use tax collection liability upon the seller consistent with the due process
and commerce clauses. The Court broke no new doctrinal ground in concluding,
on the basis of a detailed factual analysis of the relevant precedents, that the Society
fell on the taxable side of the sharp line the Court had drawn " 'between mail order
sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within [the taxing] State, and those
. . . who do no more than communicate with customers in the State by mail or
common carrier as a part of a general interstate business.'" 97 S. Ct. at 1392 (quoting National Bellas Hess Co. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967) ).
Although the Court adverted to the principles underlying the decisions discussed
herein, see 91 S. Ct. at 1391, it is plain that determination of an out-of-state vendor's
duty to collect use taxes will continue to depend essentially on the nature and extent
of its contacts with the taxing state.
162. The thesis of this Article is likely to be tested as a result of the Supreme
Court's agreement to review the decision of the Washington Supreme Court in Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos. v. State Dept. of Revenue, 88 Wash. 2d 315,
559 P.2d 997 (1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3184 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1977). In that
-case, the state court held that the commerce and import-export clauses rendered
unconstitutional the application of Washington's business and occupation tax to gross
receipts from stevedoring activity. The court relied upon the decisions of Puget
Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Commn., 302 U.S. 90 (1937), and Joseph v.
Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947), as a basis for concluding that
"[t]he United States Supreme Court obviously views stevedoring as an integrated
inseparable part of commerce by sea, and hence absolutely protected.'' 88 Wash. 2d
at_, 559 P.2d at 998. The dissent, relying on the Court's more recent precedents,
suggested that the stevedoring cases had been "impliedly overruled," and it observed
that nondiscriminatory taxes on interstate commerce had been sustained. 88 Wash.
2d at_, 559 P.2d at 999-1000 (Utter, J., dissenting). The decision of the state
court preceded the Supreme Court's decision in Complete Auto Transit by a month.

